In the scientific literature, there is ambiguity in the distinction between the concepts of giftedness and talent. This paper examines several common definitions of these two terms, with particular emphasis on the models proposed by Renzulli (1979) 
giftedness and talent: the former is associated with domains of abilities which foster and explain exceptional performance in varied fields of activities, that is, talents. Thus, one can be gifted without necessarily being talented (as with the case of underachievers), but not vice versa. Several factors which can act as catalysts for the actualization of giftedness in specific talents are discussed, particularly motivation and environmental quality.
In general usage, no definite distinction is made between the ideas of giftedness and talent. One will as likely say &dquo;Peter is scholastically gifted&dquo; or &dquo;he has great academic talent,&dquo; &dquo;Nicole is a gifted painter&dquo; or &dquo;her work shows a lot of talent as a painter,&dquo; etc. These two terms are confused not only colloquially but also in dictionary usage. For example, Webster' s Dictionary defines &dquo;gifted&dquo; as &dquo;possessing natural talent&dquo; (1970, p. 162) . Even the scientific literature on giftedness, principally deriving from American sources, supports this ambiguity by randomly using one or the other term in the same paragraph, thus suggesting that they are synonyms. Only a few authors have attempted to clearly distinguish between these two concepts.
This ambiguity in terminology reflects the conceptual ambiguity of giftedness and talent. After more than a halfcentury of research on giftedness, the concept remains subject to various and sometimes divergent definitions. Richert, Alvino and McDonnell even speak of a &dquo;labyrinth of seemingly conflicting definitions in use in the United States&dquo; (1982, p. 84) . This is a disturbing situation in that the accepted definition determines both the procedures used to identify the gifted and the content of enrichment programs offered to those identified (Passow, 1981) . ).
The object of the present essay is to demonstrate that these two concepts are in no way synonymous, but encompass completely separate ideas. We will begin this demonstration by reviewing the principal distinctions outlined in the North American literature. This descriptive and critical analysis will lead to the presentation of a model for differentiating between these two ideas.
Review of the Literature
Four major trends of opinion are presented in the literature : (a) no distinctions between giftedness and talent, (b) conceptual separation between intelligence and other abilities, (c) marginal distinctions, and, finally, (d) the recent models of Renzulli and Cohn, subsequently integrated by Foster (1981) . ).
Nondifferentiation
Those who indicate nondifferentiation constitute by far the most important school of thought. One only has to read the recent Gifted Child Quarterly issue on identification (1984, 28 (4) ) to observe this nondifferentiation in action. We have selected only a few examples from well-known authors. In a recent article, Gallagher (1979) takes cognizance of several pressing issues in the area of giftedness, one of these being the lack of definition of this concept.
Nowhere in this article does he make a distinction between giftedness and talent. These two terms are used interchangeably. Torrance (1980) (Marland, 1972) Renzulli, 1975, p. 62 Gowan (1979) maintains that giftedness and talent respectively correspond to verbal and nonverbal creative potential. Owing to their limited acceptance, the above definitions will not be considered in greater detail. The Renzulli and Cohn Models Probably the most well-known attempt to redefine giftedness is credited to Renzulli (1978 Renzulli ( , 1979 . He puts forward two major criticisms, among others, to the definition proposed by the U.S. Office of Education (Marland, 1972 Figure 1 .
Similarly, Cohn (1977 Cohn ( , 1981 has formulated a model of giftedness which clearly dissociates the concepts of giftedness and talent. Cohn's model, presented in Figure 2 , breaks down giftedness into three major categories of abilities-intellectual, artistic, and social-each one further divisible into more specific subcategories of talents.
Recently, Foster (1981) has attempted to integrate the models of Renzulli and Cohn. As illustrated in Figure 3 (Osipow, 1973, cited by Foster, 1981 (1979) and World Council for Gifted and Talented Children. Reprinted by permission.
fied. It is true that &dquo;it is usually the originality, novelty, or uniqueness of a person's contribution that brings him or her to the attention of the public&dquo; (Renzulli, 1979, p. 15 Figure 2) , disagreement must be expressed. Indeed, the arts constitute several fields of talent to which no specific &dquo;artistic&dquo; abilities correspond. Moreover, no taxonomy of human abilities ever included artistic ability (on this subject see Anastasi, 1982, chap. 13 (Passow, 1981, p. (Carroll, 1982 1. Four major domains of human ability are suggested: intellectual, creative, socioaffective, and sensorimotor. Since we have not made detailed inventory on this subject, the door is being left open for the identification or differentiation of other general domains of ability. It should be noted that the term sensorimotor ability is given preference over psychomotor, in order to underscore the important role of the various senses in many spheres of talent (e.g., marksmanship, wine tasting, perfume analysis).
2. Owing to important differences among authors and to insufficient research, the particular domains of ability are not specified. For example, in the intellectual domain alone, subcategories can vary considerably. In opposition to upholders of the g factor who vigorously defend the general IQ, a fair number of researchers have tried to identify relatively independent groups and subgroups of abilities through factor analysis. Work by Thurstone, Kelly, Guilford, Vernon, and many others, aptly synthesized by Anastasi (1982, chapter 13) , suggests a large variety of abilities : verbal, numerical, spatial, perceptual, mechanical, mnemonic, etc. Some systems (e.g., Thurstone) place these in parallel, others (e.g., Vernon), create a hierarchy of major, minor, and specific factors. For his part, Guilford has proposed a tridimensional model of the structure of intellect whose 120 cells stem from the junction of six operations, four contents, and five different products.
As if the problem was not already sufficiently complex and in dire need of some synthesis, specialists in cognitive psychology have also brought forth taxonomies of cognitive abilities. For example, consider the recent proposal by Sternberg (1981, 1984) of a triarchic theory of intelligence encompassing three distinct subtheories: a componential subtheory that posits three kinds of information-processing abilities (metacomponents, performance components, and knowledge-acquisition components), a two facet subtheory which relates the above components to performance in coping with either novelty or automatization and, finally, a contextual subtheory comprised of three hierarchically related processes (adaptation, selection, shaping) which attempts to achieve the best possible fit between the individual and his sociocultural environment.
Finally, in a most interesting effort to synthesize available knowledge from psychometrics, cognitive psychology, and neuropsychology, Gardner (1982a Gardner ( , 1982b (Feldhusen, Asher, & Hoover, 1984 (Renzulli, 1984, p. 164 (Campbell, 1977 Wells (1981) , it was the State of Louisiana that took this initiative. However, the adopted definition is not cited.
